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Abstract
In this paper we survey various notions of symmetry for finite strategic-form games; show that
game bijections and game isomorphisms form groupoids; introduce matchings as a convenient char-
acterisation of strategy triviality; and outline how to construct and partially order parameterised
symmetric games with numerous examples that range all combinations of surveyed symmetry no-
tions.
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1 Introduction
The notion of a game being fair may be made more precise with the concept of symmetry. Broadly
speaking we will consider a game fair when the players are indifferent between which position they play,
however there are several distinct notions of symmetry that are possible which lead to variations in
structure and fairness. For example, the players may or may not care about the arrangement of their
opponents.
This paper aims to survey numerous notions of symmetry for finite strategic-form games whilst filling
various holes. Symmetry in the context of games was first explored by von Neumann and Morgenstern
(1944), outlining what we will later refer to as our label-dependent framework in which player permuta-
tions act on strategy profiles, consequently requiring all players have the same strategy labels.
Soon after Nash (1951) famously showed that symmetric games have at least one mixed strategy Nash
equilibrium that is invariant under player permutations, while more recently Cheng et al. (2004) showed
that fully symmetric 2-strategy games have at least one pure strategy Nash equilibrium.
Under the theme of anonymity rather than fairness, Brandt et al. (2009) examined label-dependent
notions where players are indifferent between who plays which strategy.
Nash (1951), Peleg et al. (1999), Sudho¨lter et al. (2000), and Stein (2011) have examined notions of
symmetry which may not be captured inside our label-dependent framework. In order to discuss and
analyse such notions we will need to make a detour to examine morphisms between games, the complexity
of which has been investigated by Gabarro´ et al. (2007). Inside what will later be referred to as our label-
independent framework game automorphisms act on strategy profiles, which also allows players to have
distinct strategy labels.
We begin in Section 2 by reviewing numerous mathematical concepts that will play an important role
throughout our analysis. In Section 3 we survey various label-dependent notions of anonymity and
fairness.
In Section 4 we review game morphisms while showing that game bijections and game isomorphisms form
groupoids, which appears to be missing from relevant literature, and introduce matchings as a convenient
characterisation of strategy triviality.
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Finally, in Section 5 we survey various label-independent notions of fairness, discuss how to classify
a given game, and outline how to construct and partially order parameterised symmetric games with
numerous examples that range over various classes.
2 Background
In this paper we will only concern ourselves with finite games, consequently all sets are implicitly finite.
Let N = {1, ..., n} where n ≥ 2 and let {Ai : i ∈ N} be a collection of non-empty sets, with the Cartesian
product of A1, ..., An denoted as ×i∈NAi. To simplify notation, for each i ∈ N we denote ×j∈N−{i}Aj as
A−i, for each s ∈ ×i∈NAi and i ∈ N we denote the element of Ai in position i as si, and for each si ∈ Ai
and s−i = (s1, ..., si−1, si+1, ..., sn) ∈ A−i we denote (s1, ..., si−1, si, si+1, ..., sn) ∈ ×i∈NAi as (si, s−i).
A relation on A1, ..., An is a subset R of their Cartesian product ×i∈NAi. Let i ∈ N , we say that R
is i-total when for each si ∈ Ai there exists s−i ∈ A−i such that (si, s−i) ∈ R, and i-unique when
(si, s−i), (si, s
′
−i) ∈ R implies s−i = s
′
−i.
A strategic-form game, or just game when contextually unambiguous, consists of a set N = {1, ..., n}
of n ≥ 2 players, and for each player i ∈ N , a non-empty set Ai of strategies and a utility function
ui : A → R, where A denotes the set of strategy profiles ×i∈NAi. We denote such a game as the triple
(N,A, u), where u = (ui)i∈N . If there exists m ∈ Z
+ such that |Ai| = m for all i ∈ N then (N,A, u) is
called an m-strategy game. A game (N,A, u) is finite when both N is finite and Ai is finite for all i ∈ N .
A game may be displayed pictorially as a list of matrices. We list the strategies from players n− 1 and
n along the rows and columns respectively, and for games with more than two players have a separate
matrix for each strategy combination of the remaining players. Each strategy profile s ∈ A corresponds
to a unique cell in one of the matrices where the payoffs are written in the form
(
ui(s)
)
i∈N
.
2.1 Example: 3-player 2-strategy game.
a b
a 1, 1, 1 2, 2, 3
b 2, 3, 2 4, 5, 5
(a, , )
a b
a 3, 2, 2 5, 4, 5
b 5, 5, 4 6, 6, 6
(b, , )
We find the payoff to player 3 for the strategy profile (b, b, a) ∈ A as follows: reading the strategy profile
from left to right, player 1 has chosen the second matrix, player 2 has chosen the second row and player
3 has chosen the first column, the third value of which is the payoff to player 3. Hence u3(b, b, a) = 4.
A pure strategy Nash equilibrium is a strategy profile s ∈ A where for each i ∈ N , ui(si, s−i) ≥ ui(s
′
i, s−i)
for all s′i ∈ Ai. For example, in Example 2.1 the profile (b, b, b) is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium.
We denote the subgroup relation as ≤, the group generated by a subset H of a group G as 〈H〉, the group
of permutations on a non-empty set N as SN , and the subset of transpositions on N as TN . The reader
is reminded that the permutations on N are equivalent to the bijections from N to itself, henceforth we
will refer to them interchangeably.
An action of a group G on a set N is a homomorphism α from G into the bijections from N to itself.
For each g ∈ G and i ∈ N we denote
(
α(g)
)
(i) as g(i). When G acts on the left or right of N the
action is called a left or right action respectively. We note that left actions can be defined equivalently
as antihomomorphisms that act on the right, and dually for right actions.
An action is transitive if for each i, j ∈ N there exists g ∈ G such that g(i) = j, regular if for each
i, j ∈ N there exists precisely one g ∈ G such that g(i) = j, and n-transitive if for each pi ∈ SN there
exists g ∈ G such that g(i) = pi(i) for all i ∈ N . When an action of G can be inferred we simply refer to
G as being transitive, regular or n-transitive respectively.
The stabiliser of i ∈ N , which we denote as Gi, is the subgroup {g ∈ G : g(i) = i} of elements in G
that fix i. Similarly the stabiliser of N , which we denote as GN , is the normal subgroup {g ∈ G : g(i) =
i for all i ∈ N} = ∩i∈NGi of elements in G that fix each i ∈ N .
The orbit of i ∈ N is G(i) = {g(i) : g ∈ G}. The orbits of N , denoted as N/G, is the set {G(i) : i ∈ N}
which forms a partition of N .
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By a groupoid we mean a category in which every morphism is bijective. For the sake of brevity, when
the objects of a groupoid can be inferred we refer to the morphisms as a groupoid.
3 Label-Dependent Notions of Symmetry
There are various ways to define a notion of symmetry, not all of which are distinct. In each case we
need all players to have the same number of strategies, consequently all games are implicitly m-strategy
games. It is often assumed when defining symmetric games that all players have the same strategy
labels and any notion of symmetry will treat the same labels as equivalent. We shall refer to these as
label-dependent notions.
3.1 Permutations Acting On Strategy Profiles
There is some confusion (Dasgupta and Maskin, 1986) over how to correctly define symmetric games,
in order to provide clarity we need to review two ways that player permutations may act on strategy
profiles.
Given a permutation pi ∈ SN , two action choices are (si)i∈N 7→ (spi(i))i∈N and (si)i∈N 7→ (spi−1(i))i∈N .
We denote (spi−1(i))i∈N as pi(s), for example given (s1, ..., sn) ∈ A, pi(s1, ..., sn) = (spi−1(1), ..., spi−1(n)).
The author notes that our somewhat unintuitive notation has been chosen so that it matches with
composition and inversion in an ideal manner. That is so for each s ∈ A, (τ ◦ pi)(s) = τ
(
pi(s)
)
and
(τ ◦ pi)−1 = pi−1 ◦ τ−1.
3.1 Lemma: s 7→ pi(s) is a left action of SN on A.
Proof. The identity permutation trivially acts as an identity so we need only establish associativity.
For each pi, τ ∈ SN , s ∈ A and i ∈ N ,
(
(τ ◦ pi)(s)
)
i
= s(τ◦pi)−1(i) = spi−1(τ−1(i)) =
(
pi(s)
)
τ−1(i)
=(
τ
(
pi(s)
))
i
.
Since pi−1(s) = (spi(i))i∈N for all s ∈ A, s 7→ pi(s) and s 7→ pi
−1(s) are dual to each other. Hence the dual
results hold for pi−1.
3.2 Lemma: s 7→ pi−1(s) is a right action of SN on A.
Given pi ∈ SN we denote the map s 7→ upi(i)
(
pi(s)
)
as upi(i) ◦ pi.
3.3 Corollary: For each pi, τ ∈ SN , u(τ◦pi)(i) ◦ (τ ◦ pi) = (uτ(pi(i)) ◦ τ) ◦ pi.
Proof. For each i ∈ N , s ∈ A,
(
u(τ◦pi)(i) ◦ (τ ◦ pi)
)
(s) = u(τ◦pi)(i)
(
(τ ◦ pi)(s)
)
= uτ(pi(i))
(
τ
(
pi(s)
))
=(
(uτ(pi(i)) ◦ τ) ◦ pi
)
(s).
3.2 Game Invariants
Game invariants give us a notion of players being indifferent between the current positions and an
alternative arrangement of positions.
3.4 Definition: pi ∈ SN is an invariant of Γ if for each i ∈ N , ui = upi(i) ◦ pi.
3.5 Lemma: The invariants of a game form a group.
Proof. Since the identity permutation e ∈ SN acts as an identity on A it follows that ui = ui ◦ e for all
i ∈ N , hence e is an invariant. Suppose pi ∈ SN is an invariant of Γ, and hence that for each i ∈ N ,
upi−1(i) = ui ◦ pi. Then for each i ∈ N , ui = (ui ◦ pi) ◦ pi
−1 = upi−1(i) ◦ pi
−1. Finally suppose pi, τ ∈ SN are
invariants of Γ. Then for each i ∈ N , ui = upi(i) ◦ pi = (uτ(pi(i)) ◦ τ) ◦ pi = u(τ◦pi)(i) ◦ (τ ◦ pi).
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3.3 Notions of Anonymity
Before surveying label-dependent notions of fairness we review various notions of anonymity introduced
by Brandt et al. (2009).
Central to anonymity is the notion that players do not distinguish between their opponents, by which
we mean each player merely cares about the strategies being played by their opponents and is indifferent
between who is playing them.
3.6 Definition: Γ is weakly anonymous if for each i ∈ N , pi ∈ SN−{i}, ui = ui ◦ pi.
.
3.7 Example: Weakly Anonymous 3-player game.
a b
a 0, 1, 2 4, 6, 7
b 4, 5, 8 9, 12, 14
(a, , )
a b
a 3, 6, 8 10, 11, 14
b 10, 12, 13 15, 16, 17
(b, , )
The reader may like to verify that ui = ui ◦ (jk) for all distinct i, j, k ∈ N . For example, u1(a, b, a) =
4 = u1
(
(23)(a, b, a)
)
= u1(a, a, b). Since SN−{i} = {e, (jk)} for all i ∈ N , Γ is weakly anonymous.
When we say that players do not distinguish between their opponents, we mean for example that when
playing a, player 1 is indifferent between the strategy profiles (a, a, b) and (a, b, a).
Note we are analysing symmetry under the theme of fairness rather than anonymity. Consequently we
are referring to what Brandt et al. (2009) called weakly symmetric and weakly anonymous as weakly
anonymous and anonymous respectively.
Weak anonymity may be strengthened by requiring the players care merely about the strategies being
played and be indifferent between who is playing each strategy, or equivalently, by requiring each player
have the same payoff for each orbit in A/SN .
3.8 Definition: Γ is anonymous if for each i ∈ N , pi ∈ SN , ui = ui ◦ pi.
3.9 Example: Anonymous 3-player game.
a b
a 0, 1, 2 3, 4, 5
b 3, 4, 5 6, 7, 8
(a, , )
a b
a 3, 4, 5 6, 7, 8
b 6, 7, 8 9, 10, 11
(b, , )
The reader may like to verify the orbits of A are given by A/SN =
{
{(a, a, a)},
{(a, a, b), (a, b, a), (b, a, a)}, {(a, b, b), (b, a, b), (b, b, a)}, {(b, b, b)}
}
and that each player has the same payoff
for each orbit in A/SN .
For example, let pi = (123), then we have pi(s1, s2, s3) = (spi−1(1), spi−1(2), spi−1(3)) = (s3, s1, s2) giving us
pi(a, a, b) = (b, a, a).
Anonymity may be strengthened also by requiring all players have the same payoff for each orbit in
A/SN .
3.10 Definition: Γ is fully anonymous if for each i, j ∈ N , pi ∈ SN , ui = uj ◦ pi.
3.11 Example: Fully anonymous 3-player game.
a b
a 1, 1, 1 2, 2, 2
b 2, 2, 2 3, 3, 3
(a, , )
a b
a 2, 2, 2 3, 3, 3
b 3, 3, 3 4, 4, 4
(b, , )
The orbits of A for the above game are the same as in Example 3.9, however now all players have the
same payoff for each orbit.
In a fully anonymous game each player is indifferent between which position they play. Hence fully
anonymous games are one class of games that fall under our broad requirements for fairness.
4
3.4 Notions of Fairness
Our broad requirements for fairness that players be indifferent between which position they play may be
made more precise by requiring the invariants of a game be a transitive subgroup of SN .
3.12 Definition: Γ is standard symmetric (Stein, 2011) if there exists a transitive subgroup H of the
player permutations such that for each i ∈ N and pi ∈ H , ui = upi(i) ◦ pi.
In a standard symmetric game, while being indifferent between which position they play, each player may
care about the arrangement of their opponents, or alternatively may distinguish between their opponents.
3.13 Example: Standard symmetric 3-player game.
a b
a 1, 1, 1 3, 7, 4
b 7, 4, 3 6, 5, 8
(a, , )
a b
a 4, 3, 7 8, 6, 5
b 5, 8, 6 2, 2, 2
(b, , )
The reader may like to verify that Γ is invariant under (123) and not invariant under (12). Since
〈(123)〉 = {e, (123), (132)} is a transitive subgroup of S3, Γ is standard symmetric. Furthermore since
(12) is not an invariant the players are not indifferent between all possible position arrangements.
A useful analogy for considering the fairness of Γ is a game with three players sitting in a circle such that
each player is indifferent between circular rotations of positions, and not indifferent to their opponents
swapping positions.
We obtain a stronger level of fairness by requiring the players be indifferent between all possible position
rearrangements, that is by requiring all player permutations be invariants.
3.14 Definition: Γ is fully symmetric if it is invariant under SN .
The reader may like to verify that Example 2.1 is invariant under the permutations (12) and (123). For
example, let pi = (123), then pi(s1, s2, s3) = (s3, s1, s2) giving us u1(b, a, a) = u2(a, b, a) = u3(a, a, b) = 3.
Since invariants are closed under composition and 〈(12), (123)〉 = S3, Example 2.1 is fully symmetric.
Next we establish that Definition 3.14 can be characterised by various conditions.
3.15 Theorem: The following conditions are equivalent:
(i) Γ is fully symmetric;
(ii) Γ is standard symmetric and weakly anonymous;
(iii) For each i ∈ N and pi ∈ SN , upi(i) = ui ◦ pi
−1;
(iv) For each i ∈ N and τ ∈ TN , ui = uτ(i) ◦ τ ; and
(v) For each i ∈ N and τ ∈ TN , ui = uτ(i) ◦ τ
−1.
Proof. Condition (ii) follows trivially from Condition (i). Now suppose Condition (ii) is satisfied and letH
be a transitive subgroup of player permutations under which Γ is invariant. Let pi ∈ SN , i ∈ N and τ ∈ H
such that τ(i) = pi(i). Since (τ−1 ◦ pi) ∈ SN−{i} it follows from weak anonymity that ui = ui ◦ (τ
−1 ◦ pi).
It also follows from standard symmetry that ui = uτ(i) ◦τ , putting these two bits of information together
we have ui = ui ◦ (τ
−1 ◦ pi) = (uτ(i) ◦ τ) ◦ (τ
−1 ◦ pi) = uτ(i) ◦ (τ ◦ τ
−1) ◦ pi = uτ(i) ◦ pi = upi(i) ◦ pi.
Suppose Condition (i) is satisfied, then for each i ∈ N and pi ∈ SN , upi(i) = upi(i) ◦ (pi ◦ pi
−1) =
(upi(i) ◦ pi) ◦ pi
−1 = ui ◦ pi
−1. The converse works the same in reverse giving equivalence of Conditions (i)
and (iii).
Condition (i) implies Condition (iv) since TN ⊆ SN , and Condition (iv) implies Condition (i) directly
from Corollary 3.3 and that 〈TN 〉 = SN . Conditions (iv) and (v) are equivalent since each transposition
is its own inverse.
Condition (iii) in Theorem 3.15 was used by von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944), which was ideal for
their chosen notation of permutations acting on the right of players and strategy profiles. Of course any
generating set of SN may replace TN in Condition (iv) of Theorem 3.15.
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Notably it is easy to mistakingly use the following inequivalent condition: for each i ∈ N and pi ∈ SN ,
ui = upi(i) ◦ pi
−1 (Dasgupta and Maskin, 1986). However this does not permute the players and strategy
profiles correctly as the right hand side does not have player pi(i) playing the strategy that player i is
playing, which we illustrate using Example 2.1.
Let pi = (123) ∈ S3, the incorrect condition given by Dasgupta and Maskin (1986) requires that for
each i ∈ N and (s1, s2, s3) ∈ A, we have ui(s1, s2, s3) = upi(i)(spi(1), spi(2), spi(3)) = upi(i)(s2, s3, s1). By
considering (b, a, a) ∈ A, we see that 3 = u1(b, a, a) 6= u2(a, a, b) = 2. It should be fairly obvious that if
we are mapping player 1 to player 2 and player 1 is playing b then we want the mapped strategy profile
to have player 2 playing b.
Since TN ⊆ SN , it follows from Condition (v) in Theorem 3.15 that the incorrect condition from
Dasgupta and Maskin (1986) is somewhat surprisingly a more restrictive condition than the conditions
in Theorem 3.15. When n = 2, since each transposition is its own inverse, the incorrect condition from
Dasgupta and Maskin (1986) is equivalent to the conditions in Theorem 3.15. We now establish that
for n ≥ 3 the incorrect condition from Dasgupta and Maskin (1986) is equivalent to the condition for a
game being fully anonymous.
3.16 Lemma: (Brandt et al., 2009) The following conditions are equivalent:
(i) Γ is fully anonymous; and
(ii) Γ is fully symmetric and ui = uj for all i, j ∈ N .
3.17 Lemma: Let pi, τ ∈ SN . If ui = upi(i) ◦pi
−1 = uτ(i) ◦ τ
−1 for all i ∈ N then ui = u(τ◦pi)(i) ◦ (pi ◦ τ)
−1
for all i ∈ N .
Proof. For each i ∈ N , ui = upi(i) ◦ pi
−1 = (uτ(pi(i)) ◦ τ
−1) ◦ pi−1 = u(τ◦pi)(i) ◦ (pi ◦ τ)
−1.
3.18 Theorem: If n ≥ 3 then the following conditions are equivalent:
(i) Γ is fully symmetric and ui = uj for all i, j ∈ N ; and
(ii) For each i ∈ N and pi ∈ SN , ui = upi(i) ◦ pi
−1.
Proof. Suppose Condition (i) holds, then for each i ∈ N and pi ∈ SN , ui = upi−1(i) ◦ pi
−1 = upi(i) ◦ pi
−1.
Conversely suppose Condition (ii) holds, and hence that Γ is fully symmetric. Let i, j, k ∈ N be distinct.
Since (ik)◦ (ijk)◦ (jk) = (ijk) and
(
(jk)◦ (ijk)◦ (ik)
)−1
= (ik)◦ (ikj)◦ (jk) = e, it follows from Lemma
3.17 that ui = uj .
4 Morphisms Between Games
There are two important reasons why our simplifying assumption that players have the same strategy
labels leaves our analysis incomplete. Our first reason is that relabelling the strategies for a standard
symmetric game leads to a strategically equivalent game that may no longer be considered symmetric
inside our label-dependent framework.
Ideally we want to be able to determine when two games merely differ by player and strategy labels
without having to go through and check all possible rearrangements of the labels.
Our second reason is that there are weaker notions of fairness that cannot be captured within our label-
dependent framework. As a motivating example consider Matching Pennies.
4.1 Example: Matching Pennies
H T
H 1,−1 −1, 1
T −1, 1 1,−1
It is clear just by looking at the payoff matrix that Matching Pennies is fair, yet inside our label dependent
framework the only invariant is the identity permutation, a problem that persists if we swap the strategy
labels for either or both of the players.
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4.1 Game Bijections
4.2 Definition: A game bijection from Γ1 = (N,A, u) to Γ2 = (M,B, v) consists of a bijection pi : N →
M and for each player i ∈ N , a bijection τi : Ai → Bpi(i), which we denote as
(
pi; (τi)i∈N
)
.
We denote the set of game bijections from Γ1 to Γ2 as Bij(Γ1,Γ2), or simply SΓ for the bijections from a
game Γ to itself. Let g =
(
pi; (τi)i∈N
)
∈ Bij(Γ1,Γ2), i ∈ N , si ∈ Ai and s ∈ A, using similar notation to
our label-dependent framework we denote pi(i) as g(i), τi(si) as g(si),
(
τpi−1(j)(spi−1(j))
)
j∈M
∈ B as g(s)
giving
(
g(s)
)
g(i)
= τi(si) = g(si), and the map s 7→ ug(i)
(
g(s)
)
as ug(i) ◦ g.
4.3 Example: Consider the following 2-player games.
c d
a 1, 2 3, 4
b 5, 6 7, 8
Γ1
g h
e 4, 3 8, 7
f 2, 1 6, 5
Γ2
Given (a, c) ∈ A and g =
(
(12);
(
a b
g h
)
,
(
c d
f e
))
∈ Bij(Γ1,Γ2), g(a, c) = (f, g).
Let Γ3 = (L,C,w) also be a game. For g =
(
pi; (τi)i∈N
)
∈ Bij(Γ1,Γ2) and h =
(
η; (φj)j∈M
)
∈ Bij(Γ2,Γ3),
their composite, denoted h ◦ g, is
(
η ◦ pi; (φpi(i) ◦ τi)i∈N
)
∈ Bij(Γ1,Γ3), and the inverse of g, denoted g
−1,
is
(
pi−1; (τ−1
pi−1(j))j∈M
)
∈ Bij(Γ2,Γ1).
4.4 Example: Consider Example 3.13 except with strategy labels A2 = {c, d} and A3 = {e, f} for
players 2 and 3 respectively. We compose and invert bijections g =
(
(123);
(
a b
d c
)
,
(
c d
e f
)
,
(
e f
b a
))
, h =(
(12);
(
a b
c d
)
,
(
c d
a b
)
,
(
e f
f e
))
∈ SΓ as follows:
h ◦ g =
(
(12);
(
a b
c d
)
,
(
c d
a b
)
,
(
e f
f e
))
◦
(
(123);
(
a b
d c
)
,
(
c d
e f
)
,
(
e f
b a
))
=
(
(12) ◦ (123);
(
c d
a b
)
◦
(
a b
d c
)
,
(
e f
f e
)
◦
(
c d
e f
)
,
(
a b
c d
)
◦
(
e f
b a
))
=
(
(23);
(
a b
b a
)
,
(
c d
f e
)
,
(
e f
d c
))
; and
g−1 =
(
(123);
(
a b
d c
)
,
(
c d
e f
)
,
(
e f
b a
))−1
=
(
(123)−1;
(
e f
b a
)−1
,
(
a b
d c
)−1
,
(
c d
e f
)−1)
=
(
(132);
(
a b
f e
)
,
(
c d
b a
)
,
(
e f
c d
))
.
4.5 Lemma: (h ◦ g)(s) = h(g(s)) for all s ∈ A.
Proof.
(h ◦ g)(s) =
(
η ◦ pi; (φpi(i) ◦ τi)i∈N
)
(s)
=
(
φη−1(k) ◦ τ(η◦pi)−1(k)(s(η◦pi)−1(k))
)
k∈L
=
(
φη−1(k)
(
τpi−1(η−1(k))(spi−1(η−1(k)))
))
k∈L
=
(
φη−1(k)
(
g(s)η−1(k)
))
k∈L
=
(
h
(
g(s)
)
k
)
k∈L
= h(g(s)).
4.6 Corollary: u(h◦g)(i) ◦ (h ◦ g) = (uh(g(i)) ◦ h) ◦ g for all i ∈ N .
Proof. This follows identically to the proof of Corollary 3.3.
4.7 Theorem: Game bijections form a groupoid.
Proof. Let Γ3 = (P,C), Γ4 = (Q,D), f =
(
pi; (τi)i∈N
)
∈ Bij(Γ1,Γ2), g =
(
η; (φj)j∈M
)
∈ Bij(Γ2,Γ3),
h =
(
ξ; (λk)k∈P
)
∈ Bij(Γ3,Γ4). Then:
f ◦ idΓ1 =
(
pi ◦ idN ; (τi ◦ idAi)i∈N
)
7
= f =
(
idM ◦ pi; (idBpi(i) ◦ τi)i∈N
)
= idΓ2 ◦ f ;
f ◦ f−1 =
(
pi ◦ pi−1; (τpi−1(j) ◦ τ
−1
pi−1(j))j∈M
)
= idΓ2 ;
f−1 ◦ f =
(
pi−1 ◦ pi; (τ−1
pi−1(pi(i)) ◦ τi)i∈N
)
= idΓ1 ; and
h ◦ (g ◦ f) =
(
ξ; (λk)k∈P
)
◦
(
η ◦ pi; (φpi(i) ◦ τi)i∈N
)
=
(
ξ ◦ η ◦ pi; (λ(η◦pi)(i) ◦ φpi(i) ◦ τi)i∈N
)
=
(
ξ ◦ η; (λη(j) ◦ φj)j∈M
)
◦
(
pi; (τi)i∈N
)
= (h ◦ g) ◦ f.
4.2 Game Isomorphisms
Game isomorphisms are game bijections that preserve strategic structure, they are useful for establishing
strategic equivalence between games, or as we will be using them, for considering label-independent
notions of symmetry.
We will only require the strictest notion of game isomorphism to explore label-independent notions of
symmetry, treating two games as isomorphic when they differ only by the player and strategy labels.
However one can define ordinal and cardinal game isomorphisms by requiring preservation of preferences
over pure and mixed strategy profiles respectively, then characterise each by the existence of increasing
monotonic and affine transformations respectively (Harsanyi and Selten, 1988).
4.8 Definition: A bijection g ∈ Bij(Γ1,Γ2) is a game isomorphism if ui = vg(i) ◦ g for all i ∈ N .
We denote by Isom(Γ1,Γ2) the set of isomorphisms from Γ1 to Γ2. The reader may like to verify that
the bijection in Example 4.3 is in fact an isomorphism. For example, u1(a, d) = vg(1)
(
g(a, d)
)
= v2(e, g).
4.9 Theorem: Game isomorphisms form a groupoid.
Proof. For each g ∈ Isom(Γ1,Γ2) and j ∈ M , vj = (vj ◦ g) ◦ g
−1 = ug−1(j) ◦ g
−1, giving us g−1 ∈
Isom(Γ2,Γ1). Let Γ3 = (P,C,w), then for each g ∈ Isom(Γ1,Γ2), h ∈ Isom(Γ2,Γ3) and i ∈ N , ui =
vg(i) ◦ g = (wh(g(i)) ◦ h) ◦ g = w(h◦g)(i) ◦ (h ◦ g), giving us (h ◦ g) ∈ Isom(Γ1,Γ3).
The remaining conditions follow from Theorem 4.7.
4.10 Corollary: If Γ1 ∼= Γ2 ∼= Γ3 then Isom(Γ1,Γ2) ∼= Isom(Γ2,Γ3).
Game isomorphisms induce an equivalence relation where games in the same equivalence class have the
same strategic structure. There is a finite number of ordinal equivalence classes for games with both a
fixed number of players and fixed number of strategies for each of the players. Goforth and Robinson
(2005) counted 144 ordinal equivalence classes for the 2-player 2-strategy games.
4.3 Bijections Acting on Strategy Profiles
The bijections SΓ from a game to itself form a group that acts on the players and strategy profiles. In
fact for an m-strategy game SΓ is isomorphic to the wreath product SN ≀ SM where M = {1, ...,m},
which may be seen by setting Ai =M for all i ∈ N .
LetG be a subgroup of SΓ. We denote the subgroup of player permutations used byG as
−→
G . Furthermore,
we say that G is player transitive if G acts transitively on N , player n-transitive if G acts n-transitively
on N , and only-transitive if G acts transitively and not n-transitively on N .
4.11 Lemma: Two bijections g, h ∈ G have the same player permutation if and only if they are in the
same coset of G/GN .
Proof. Suppose g, h have the same player permutation, then h = g ◦ (g−1 ◦ h) ∈ (g ◦GN ). The converse
is obvious.
Hence the factor group G/GN merely tells us what player permutations are used by G.
4.12 Corollary: G/GN ∼=
−→
G .
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The isomorphisms from a game to itself form a subgroup of the game bijections called the automorphism
group of Γ, which we denote as Aut(Γ). Game automorphisms capture the notion of players being
indifferent between the current positions and an alternative arrangement of positions. Note our definition
is equivalent to the definition used by Nash (1951).
For the sake of brevity, we refer to a subgroup of Aut(Γ) as a subgroup of Γ, denote the stabiliser
subgroup of Aut(Γ) on N as ΓN , and denote the player permutations used by Aut(Γ) as
−→
Γ .
4.4 Strategy Triviality and Matchings
Now that players need not have the same strategy labels, we seek a way to determine which subgroups
of SΓ act on strategy profiles in an equivalent way to permutations for some relabelling of the strategies.
Stein (2011) introduced strategy triviality for this purpose.
4.13 Definition: A subgroup G of SΓ is strategy trivial (Stein, 2011) if for each i ∈ N , g(si) = si for
all g ∈ Gi and si ∈ Ai.
4.14 Lemma: (Stein, 2011) If G is strategy trivial then for each g, h ∈ G such that g(i) = h(i),
g(si) = h(si) for all si ∈ Ai.
Proof. Since (g−1 ◦h) ∈ Gi, by strategy triviality, g(si) = g
(
(g−1 ◦h)(si)
)
= (g◦g−1)
(
h(si)
)
= h(si).
4.15 Corollary: If G is strategy trivial then GN = {idΓ}.
Hence strategy trivial subgroups have at most one bijection for each player permutation. Example 5.9
establishes that the converse of Corollary 4.15 is false.
4.16 Corollary: If G ≤ SΓ is strategy trivial then for each i ∈ N and τ ∈
−→
G , there exists giτ(i) ∈
Bij(Ai, Aτ(i)) such that G = {(pi; (gipi(i))i∈N ) : pi ∈
−→
G}.
It follows that all paths from one player to another map the strategies in a canonical manner. Hence if
G is also player transitive then the strategy sets are matched such that they can be treated as the same
set. We now introduce matchings to formalise what is meant by the strategy sets being matched.
4.17 Definition: A matching of A1, ..., An is a relation M ⊆ ×i∈NAi which is i-total and i-unique for
all i ∈ N .
4.18 Example: Let A1 = {a, b}, A2 = {c, d} and A3 = {e, f}. One matching of A1 × A2 × A3 is
M = {(a, d, f), (b, c, e)}.
a c e
b d f
From a game theoretic point of view, a matching is a subset M of the strategy profiles where for each
i ∈ N and ai ∈ Ai there is exactly one s ∈M such that si = ai, and hence |M | = m.
For each i, j ∈ N , a matching M induces a bijection Mij ∈ Bij(Ai, Aj) where, given ai ∈ Ai, Mij(ai)
is the unique aj ∈ Aj such that there exists s ∈ M with si = ai and sj = aj . For example given the
matching in Example 4.18, M31 =
(
e f
b a
)
.
4.19 Lemma: {Mij : i, j ∈ N} is a groupoid.
Proof. It follows by definition that for each i, j, k ∈ N , Mii = idAi , M
−1
ij = Mji and Mjk ◦Mij = Mik.
Now for each i, j, k, l ∈ N , Mij ◦Mii = Mij = Mjj ◦Mij , Mkl ◦ (Mjk ◦Mij) = Mkl ◦Mik = Mil =
Mjl ◦Mij = (Mkl ◦Mjk) ◦Mij , Mij ◦M
−1
ij =Mij ◦Mji =Mjj and M
−1
ij ◦Mij =Mji ◦Mij =Mii.
Furthermore, for each pi ∈ SN , a matching M induces a game bijection
(
pi; (Mipi(i))i∈N
)
∈ SΓ, which we
denote as Mpi. For example given the matching in Example 4.18, M(13) =
(
(13);
(
a b
f e
)
,
(
c d
c d
)
,
(
e f
b a
))
.
For each G ⊆ SN we denote the set {Mpi : pi ∈ G} of bijections induced by G as MG.
4.20 Lemma: M : SN → SΓ is a homomorphism.
Proof. Let pi, φ ∈ SN , then Mφ ◦ Mpi =
(
φ; (Miφ(i))i∈N
)
◦
(
pi; (Mipi(i))i∈N
)
=
(
φ ◦ pi; (Mpi(i)(φ◦pi)(i) ◦
Mipi(i))i∈N
)
=
(
φ ◦ pi; (Mi(φ◦pi)(i))i∈N
)
=M(φ◦pi).
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4.21 Corollary: Mpi−1 =M
−1
pi for all pi ∈ SN .
4.22 Lemma: For each pi ∈ SN , Mpi(s) = s for all s ∈M .
Proof. For each i ∈ N ,
(
Mpi(s)
)
i
=Mpi−1(i)i(spi−1(i)) = si.
If we relabel the strategies played in each s ∈M to be the same, giving players the same strategy labels,
then each permutation pi ∈ SN acts on our relabelled strategy profiles equivalently to how Mpi acts
on our original strategy profiles. Hence a subgroup G of SΓ acts on strategy profiles equivalently to
permutations for some relabelling of the strategies precisely when G =M−→
G
for some matching M , which
we now establish occurs precisely when G is strategy trivial.
4.23 Theorem: Let G ≤ SΓ be player transitive. There exists a matching M such that M−→G = G if and
only if G is strategy trivial.
Proof. Suppose there exists a matching M such that M−→
G
= G. That M−→
G
≤ SΓ follows from Lemma
4.20. Now for each i ∈ N and g ∈ Gi, Mig(i) =Mii = idAi .
Conversely suppose G is strategy trivial. By Corollary 4.16, for each i ∈ N and τ ∈
−→
G there exists
giτ(i) ∈ Bij(Ai, Aτ(i)) such that G = {
(
pi; (gipi(i))i∈N
)
: pi ∈
−→
G}.
Let i ∈ N and M = {(gij(ai))j∈N : ai ∈ Ai}. M is a matching since for each j ∈ N and aj ∈ Aj , there
exists a unique strategy ai ∈ Ai for player i such that gij(ai) = aj . Furthermore M is independent of i
since for each k ∈ N ,
(
gij(ai)
)
j∈N
=
(
(gkj ◦ gik)(ai)
)
j∈N
. Hence Mkl = gkl for all k, l ∈ N , giving us
Mpi =
(
pi; (Mipi(i))i∈N
)
=
(
pi; (gipi(i))i∈N
)
∈ G for all pi ∈
−→
G .
Hence weakly anonymous games may be characterised as follows, similarly for anonymous and fully
anonymous games.
4.24 Corollary: The following conditions are equivalent:
(i) There exists weakly anonymous Γ′ such that Γ ∼= Γ′;
(ii) There exists player n-transitive and strategy trivial G ≤ Γ such that for each i ∈ N and g ∈ Gi,
ui = ui ◦ g; and
(iii) There exists a matching M such that for each i ∈ N and pi ∈ SN−{i}, ui = ui ◦Mpi.
We denote by M(n,m) the set of matchings for an n-player m-strategy game.
4.25 Example: (i) If m = n = 2 then, letting A1 = {a, b} and A2 = {c, d},
M(2, 2) =
{
{(a, c), (b, d)}, {(a, d), (b, c)}
}
.
(ii) If m = 3 and n = 2 then, letting A1 = {a, b, c} and A2 = {d, e, f},
M(2, 3) =
{
{(a, d), (b, e), (c, f)}, {(a, d), (b, f), (c, e)}, {(a, e), (b, d), (c, f)},
{(a, e), (b, f), (c, d)}, {(a, f), (b, d), (c, e)}, {(a, f), (b, e), (c, d)}
}
.
There are a number of ways to count the number of matchings inM(n,m). Below we present one, though
note an alternative is to establish that M(n,m) ∼= Bij(A1, A2)× ...× Bij(An−1, An).
4.26 Lemma: For each n ≥ 2: M(n, 2) is a partition of A; and |M(n, 2)| = 2n−1.
Proof. For each s ∈ A, the profile s′ where each player swaps their strategy choice is the unique profile
in A such that {s, s′} ∈M(n, 2). Consequently |M(n, 2)| = |A|2 = 2
n−1.
4.27 Lemma: For each n ≥ 2 and m ≥ 3, |M(n,m)| = mn−1|M(n,m− 1)|.
Proof. Let i ∈ N . Each ai can be matched with each a−i ∈ A−i and |A−i| = m
n−1. Furthermore, for
each (ai, a−i) there are |M(n,m− 1)| ways to match the remaining m− 1 strategies of the n players.
4.28 Theorem: For each m,n ≥ 2, |M(n,m)| = (m!)n−1.
Proof. This follows inductively from Lemmas 4.26 and 4.27.
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5 Label-Independent Notions of Symmetry
5.1 Notions of Fairness
Similar to our label-independent characterisations of our label-dependent notions of anonymity, Theorem
4.23 gives us the following label-independent characterisations of our label-dependent notions of fairness.
5.1 Corollary: The following conditions are equivalent:
(i) There exists standard symmetric Γ′ such that Γ ∼= Γ′;
(ii) Γ has a player transitive and strategy trivial subgroup G; and
(iii) There exists a matching M and player transitive T ≤ SN such that MT ≤ Aut(Γ).
5.2 Corollary: The following conditions are equivalent:
(i) There exists fully symmetric Γ′ such that Γ ∼= Γ′;
(ii) Γ has a player n-transitive and strategy trivial subgroup G; and
(iii) There exists a matching M such that MSN ≤ Aut(Γ).
Henceforth we will use fully and standard symmetric to refer to our label-independent characterisations.
5.3 Corollary: If Γ is standard symmetric then there exists a matching M such that for each s ∈ M ,
ui(s) = uj(s) for all i, j ∈ N .
Proof. This follows from Lemma 4.22.
Remember that the defining features for standard and fully symmetric games inside our label-dependent
framework were that players be indifferent between which position they play and the arrangement of
the players respectively. Inside our label-independent framework, these defining features capture larger
classes of fair games.
5.4 Definition: A game is symmetric (Stein, 2011) if its automorphism group is player transitive and
n-transitively symmetric if its automorphism group is player n-transitive.
5.5 Example: The automorphism group of Matching Pennies in Example 4.1 is
Aut(Γ) = 〈
(
(12);
(
H T
H T
)
,
(
H T
T H
))
〉
= {
(
e;
(
H T
H T
)
,
(
H T
H T
))
,
(
e;
(
H T
T H
)
,
(
H T
T H
))
,(
(12);
(
H T
H T
)
,
(
H T
T H
))
,
(
(12);
(
H T
T H
)
,
(
H T
H T
))
}.
Since Aut(Γ) is player transitive, is not strategy trivial and contains no proper transitive subgroups,
Matching Pennies is an n-transitively non-standard symmetric game.
Peleg et al. (1999), Sudho¨lter et al. (2000) considered a game symmetric if Aut(Γ)/ΓN ∼= SN . It follows
immediately from Corollary 4.12 that this is equivalent to a game being n-transitively symmetric, and
furthermore that Aut(Γ)/ΓN being isomorphic to some transitive subgroup of SN is equivalent to a game
being symmetric.
We now consider games which have a subgroup G isomorphic to SN with GN = {idΓ}. Fully symmetric
games obviously satisfy this condition, Example 5.9 shows that the converse of this is false. Below we
show that all games satisfying this condition are n-transitively standard symmetric games; the author
has been unable to show whether the converse holds.
5.6 Proposition: If Γ has a subgroup G isomorphic to SN with GN = {idΓ} then it is n-transitively
standard symmetric.
Proof. n-transitivity of Γ follows from
−→
G = SN . Now since each n-cycle generates a regular subgroup
of SN , the subgroup of G generated by an automorphism whose player permutation is an n-cycle is
transitive and strategy trivial, hence Γ is standard symmetric.
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We end our exploration of symmetry notions with games that have a transitive subgroup G isomorphic
to
−→
Γ with GN = {idΓ}. Standard symmetric games obviously satisfy this condition. To look at the
converse we consider the argument used in Proposition 5.6.
If all transitive subgroups of SN had regular subgroups then games with a transitive subgroup G iso-
morphic to
−→
Γ with GN = {idΓ} would be standard symmetric. However this is not the case, Hulpke
(2005) listed the non-regular minimally transitive permutation subgroups up to degree 30. The smallest
example is 〈(14) ◦ (25), (135) ◦ (246)〉 of degree 6 and order 12.
We will see in Example 5.13 that games which have a transitive subgroup G isomorphic to
−→
Γ with
GN = {idΓ} need not be standard symmetric.
5.2 Classifying A Game
While our distinct symmetry notions give us various descriptive definitions of strategic fairness, they
do not give us a constructive way to determine where a particular game lies. We now discuss various
strategies for classifying a game. A discussion on finding automorphisms of games can be found in
Gabarro´ et al. (2007).
To test whether a game Γ is fully or standard symmetric: we first try to construct a matching M of
the strategy sets where for each profile s ∈ M , all players have the same payoff. If no such matching
exists Γ is neither fully nor standard symmetric. For example in Matching Pennies, since there does not
exist a strategy profile where all players receive the same payoff, we can conclude Matching Pennies is
non-standard symmetric.
If such matchings exist: to test for full symmetry we check whether such a matching induces automor-
phisms for permutations that generate SN ; and to test for standard symmetry we check whether such
a matching induces automorphisms for player permutations that generate a transitive subgroup of SN ,
noting that to conclude non-standard symmetry we must check that the game is not invariant under the
bijections induced by any such matching and transitive subgroup of SN .
The reader should note that every n-cycle generates a transitive subgroup of SN , but not all transitive
subgroups of SN contain an n-cycle. For example the Klein group {e, (12) ◦ (34), (13) ◦ (24), (14) ◦ (23)}
is a transitive subgroup of S4 that does not contain any 4-cycles.
To test for n-transitivity we check whether there exists automorphisms for permutations that generate SN ;
and to test for symmetry (ie. transitivity) we check whether there exists automorphisms for permutations
that generate a transitive subgroup of SN , again noting that to conclude that a game is not symmetric
we must check that the game is not invariant under any transitive subgroup of SΓ.
If we know a game is symmetric (ie. transitive) and want to show it is only-transitive, a sufficient
condition is to find a strategy profile s ∈ A whose payoffs do not appear elsewhere under all possible
permutations. For example consider Example 3.13 and suppose it has an automorphism whose player
permutation is (23). The payoffs for the profile (a, a, b) are (3, 7, 4), so we would need a strategy profile
s ∈ A with payoffs (3, 4, 7). However no such profile exists, hence Example 3.13 is an only-transitive
standard symmetric game.
5.3 Parameterised Symmetric Games
Given a subset G of game bijections we construct the parameterised game Γ(G) of G as follows: for each
g ∈ 〈G〉, s ∈ A and i ∈ N , set ui(s) = ug(i)
(
g(s)
)
. Since automorphisms are closed under composition
we have 〈G〉 ≤ Aut(Γ), hence each orbit of (N ×A)/〈G〉 has the same payoff.
5.7 Example: Let G = {
(
(12);
(
a b
c d
)
,
(
c d
a b
))
}. For Γ(G) we require:
u1(a, c) = u2(a, c) = α u1(a, d) = u2(b, c) = γ
u1(b, c) = u2(a, d) = β u1(b, d) = u2(b, d) = δ
c d
a α, α γ, β
b β, γ δ, δ
Γ(G)
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We call α, β, γ, δ ∈ R the parameters of Γ(G). Note that distinct parameter choices may lead to strate-
gically inequivalent games, even though both games will have the same automorphism group. All fully
symmetric 2-player 2-strategy games are isomorphic to Γ(G) for at least one choice of parameters, hence
Γ(G) is a general form for fully symmetric 2-player 2-strategy games, or equivalently standard symmetric
2-player 2-strategy games.
We can define a partial order ≤ on parameterised games as follows: Γ(G) ≤ Γ(G′) when given a set of
parameter choices for Γ(G′) there exists a set of parameter choices for Γ(G) such that Γ(G) ∼= Γ(G′). We
illustrate our order in Examples 5.8 and 5.10 using the Hasse diagrams for ≤ on parameterised symmetric
2-player and 3-player 2-strategy games up to isomorphism.
5.8 Example: Hasse diagram for ≤ on parameterised symmetric 2-player 2-strategy games up to iso-
morphism.
Γ(G31)
α, α α, α
α, α α, α
Γ(G22)
α, β β, α
β, α α, β
Γ(G21)
α, α β, β
β, β α, α
Γ(G11)
α, α β, γ
γ, β δ, δ
G11 = {
(
(12);
(
a b
c d
)
,
(
c d
a b
))
}, G21 = G11 ∪ {
(
(12);
(
a b
d c
)
,
(
c d
b a
))
},
G22 = {
(
(12);
(
a b
d c
)
,
(
c d
a b
))
}, G31 = G11 ∪G22.
To construct a symmetric game or an n-transitively symmetric game we use bijections that generate a
player transitive or player n-transitive subgroup respectively.
To construct an only-transitive symmetric game it is not sufficient to use bijections that generate an
only-transitive subgroup, we must construct Γ(G) and check that it is only-transitive. This is due to 〈G〉
possibly being a proper subgroup of Aut(Γ). For example, if we take:
G = {
(
(123);
(
a b
d c
)
,
(
c d
e f
)
,
(
e f
a b
))
,
(
(123);
(
a b
c d
)
,
(
c d
f e
)
,
(
e f
a b
))
},
then N × A has one orbit under 〈G〉 (i.e. Γ(G) has one parameter/payoff) despite 〈G〉 being an only-
transitive subgroup.
To construct a standard symmetric game we use the bijections induced from a matching of the strategy
sets and player permutations which generate a transitive subgroup of SN . To construct a non-standard
symmetric game, we first choose game bijections which are not obviously from the same matching,
construct Γ(G) and check whether it is non-standard symmetric. We construct fully and non-fully
symmetric games similarly.
5.4 Examples
So far we have seen examples of fully symmetric, only-transitive standard symmetric and n-transitively
non-standard symmetric games. We now look at examples constructed with the process outlined in
Subsection 5.3 to show that our notions of symmetry are related as shown in the following Euler diagram.
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5.9 Example: n-transitively non-fully standard symmetric 3-player game.
e f
c α, α, α β, γ, δ
d γ, δ, β δ, γ, β
(a, , )
e f
c δ, β, γ β, δ, γ
d γ, β, δ α, α, α
(b, , )
G = {
(
(123);
(
a b
c d
)
,
(
c d
e f
)
,
(
e f
a b
))
,
(
(12);
(
a b
d c
)
,
(
c d
b a
)
,
(
e f
f e
))
}
Since 〈G〉 is n-transitive, and the first generator generates a player transitive and strategy trivial group
with the matching M = {(a, c, e), (b, d, f)}, Γ(G) is n-transitively and standard symmetric. Furthermore
since the bijections induced by M from player transpositions are not automorphisms, Γ(G) is non-fully
symmetric.
5.10 Example: Hasse diagram for ≤ on parameterised symmetric 3-player 2-strategy games up to
isomorphism.
Γ(G41)
α, α, α α, α, α
α, α, α α, α, α
α, α, α α, α, α
α, α, α α, α, α
Γ(G31)
α, α, α β, β, β
β, β, β α, α, α
β, β, β α, α, α
α, α, α β, β, β
Γ(G32)
α, α, α β, β, δ
β, δ, β δ, β, β
δ, β, β β, δ, β
β, β, δ α, α, α
Γ(G21)
α, α, α β, β, δ
β, δ, β σ, ρ, ρ
δ, β, β ρ, σ, ρ
ρ, ρ, σ ω, ω, ω
Γ(G22)
α, α, α β, γ, δ
γ, δ, β δ, γ, β
δ, β, γ β, δ, γ
γ, β, δ α, α, α
Γ(G23)
α, α, α β, γ, δ
γ, δ, β δ, β, γ
δ, β, γ γ, δ, β
β, γ, δ α, α, α
Γ(G11)
α, α, α β, γ, δ
γ, δ, β σ, ρ, τ
δ, β, γ τ, σ, ρ
ρ, τ, σ ω, ω, ω
G11 = {
(
(123);
(
a b
c d
)
,
(
c d
e f
)
,
(
e f
a b
))
},
G21 = G11 ∪ {
(
(12);
(
a b
c d
)
,
(
c d
a b
)
,
(
e f
e f
))
},
G22 = G11 ∪ {
(
(12);
(
a b
d c
)
,
(
c d
b a
)
,
(
e f
f e
))
},
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G23 = {
(
(123);
(
a b
d c
)
,
(
c d
f e
)
,
(
e f
b a
))
},
G31 = G21 ∪ {
(
(123);
(
a b
d c
)
,
(
c d
f e
)
,
(
e f
a b
))
},
G32 = G2i ∪G2j for all distinct i, j ∈ {1, 2, 3},
G41 = G31 ∪G32.
Cheng et al. (2004) showed that fully symmetric 2-strategy games have at least one pure strategy Nash
equilibrium. They also noted that Rock, Paper, Scissors is an example of a fully symmetric 2-player 3-
strategy game with no pure strategy Nash equilibria, and indirectly that Matching Pennies is an example
of a non-standard symmetric 2-player 2-strategy game which has no pure strategy Nash equilibria. The
reader may like to verify that Example 3.13 is a standard symmetric 2-strategy game with no pure
strategy Nash equilibria.
Note Example 5.9 is the only parameterised n-transitively non-fully standard symmetric 3-player 2-
strategy game up to isomorphism. Furthermore note there are pure strategy Nash equilibria for each
choice of parameters. The author has been unable to show whether the result from Cheng et al. (2004)
weakens to n-transitively standard symmetric 2-strategy games.
5.11 Example: Two only-transitive non-standard symmetric 4-player games.
g h
e α, β, γ, δ ρ, τ, σ, ω
f σ, ω, ρ, τ ω, ρ, τ, σ
(a, c, , )
g h
e δ, α, β, γ τ, σ, ω, ρ
f γ, δ, α, β β, γ, δ, α
(a, d, , )
g h
e β, γ, δ, α γ, δ, α, β
f τ, σ, ω, ρ δ, α, β, γ
(b, c, , )
g h
e ω, ρ, τ, σ σ, ω, ρ, τ
f ρ, τ, σ, ω α, β, γ, δ
(b, d, , )
G = {
(
(1234);
(
a b
d c
)
,
(
c d
e f
)
,
(
e f
g h
)
,
(
g h
a b
))
}
Since there does not exist any profile where the payoffs are equal and 〈G〉 is transitive, Γ(G) is non-
standard symmetric. Now for the strategy profile (a, c, e, g) we have payoffs (α, β, γ, δ). If Γ(G) had an
automorphism using (23) then there would be a strategy profile s ∈ A with payoffs (α, γ, β, δ). Since no
such profile exists Γ(G) is only-transitive.
g h
e α, α, β, β γ, δ, δ, γ
f δ, γ, γ, δ β, β, α, α
(a, c, , )
g h
e γ, δ, δ, γ α, α, β, β
f β, β, α, α δ, γ, γ, δ
(a, d, , )
g h
e δ, γ, γ, δ β, β, α, α
f α, α, β, β γ, δ, δ, γ
(b, c, , )
g h
e β, β, α, α δ, γ, γ, δ
f γ, δ, δ, γ α, α, β, β
(b, d, , )
G′ = {
(
(12) ◦ (34);
(
a b
d c
)
,
(
c d
a b
)
,
(
e f
h g
)
,
(
g h
e f
))
,
(
(13) ◦ (24);
(
a b
f e
)
,
(
c d
h g
)
,
(
e f
a b
)
,
(
g h
c d
))
,(
(14) ◦ (23);
(
a b
h g
)
,
(
c d
f e
)
,
(
e f
c d
)
,
(
g h
a b
))
}
That Γ(G′) is only-transitive non-standard symmetric follows by the same argument used for Γ(G).
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5.12 Example: n-transitively non-standard symmetric 4-player game.
g h
e α, β, β, β β, α, β, β
f β, β, β, α β, β, β, α
(a, c, , )
g h
e β, β, α, β β, α, β, β
f β, β, α, β α, β, β, β
(a, d, , )
g h
e α, β, β, β β, β, α, β
f β, α, β, β β, β, α, β
(b, c, , )
g h
e β, β, β, α β, β, β, α
f β, α, β, β α, β, β, β
(b, d, , )
G = {
(
(1234);
(
a b
c d
)
,
(
c d
e f
)
,
(
e f
h g
)
,
(
g h
a b
))
,
(
(12);
(
a b
c d
)
,
(
c d
a b
)
,
(
e f
e f
)
,
(
g h
h g
))
}
Γ(G) is n-transitive since 〈G〉 is n-transitive, and non-standard symmetric since there does not exist any
profile where all players receive the same payoff.
5.13 Example: Only-transitive non-standard symmetric 6-player game that has a subgroup 〈G〉 iso-
morphic to
−−→
〈G〉 with 〈G〉N = {idΓ}.
k l
i 1, 2, 1, 2, 1, 2 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8
j 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20
(a, c, e, g, , )
k l
i 5, 6, 7, 8, 3, 4 20, 15, 19, 17, 18, 16
j 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26 27, 27, 28, 28, 28, 27
(a, c, e, h, , )
k l
i 11, 12, 13, 14, 9, 10 29, 29, 30, 30, 30, 29
j 26, 24, 22, 23, 21, 25 4, 8, 6, 7, 5, 3
(a, c, f, g, , )
k l
i 17, 18, 19, 20, 15, 16 8, 3, 7, 5, 6, 4
j 31, 32, 32, 32, 31, 31 16, 20, 18, 19, 17, 15
(a, c, f, h, , )
k l
i 7, 8, 3, 4, 5, 6 18, 16, 20, 15, 19, 17
j 30, 29, 29, 29, 30, 30 6, 4, 8, 3, 7, 5
(a, d, e, g, , )
k l
i 19, 17, 18, 16, 20, 15 32, 31, 32, 31, 32, 31
j 13, 11, 12, 10, 14, 9 22, 26, 24, 25, 23, 21
(a, d, e, h, , )
k l
i 23, 24, 25, 26, 21, 22 12, 10, 14, 9, 13, 11
j 14, 12, 10, 11, 9, 13 2, 2, 2, 1, 1, 1
(a, d, f, g, , )
k l
i 28, 28, 28, 27, 27, 27 24, 25, 23, 21, 22, 26
j 25, 23, 24, 22, 26, 21 10, 14, 12, 13, 11, 9
(a, d, f, h, , )
k l
i 13, 14, 9, 10, 11, 12 25, 26, 21, 22, 23, 24
j 21, 25, 26, 24, 22, 23 31, 31, 31, 32, 32, 32
(b, c, e, g, , )
k l
i 30, 30, 30, 29, 29, 29 14, 9, 13, 11, 12, 10
j 9, 13, 14, 12, 10, 11 26, 21, 25, 23, 24, 22
(b, c, e, h, , )
k l
i 22, 23, 21, 25, 26, 24 10, 11, 9, 13, 14, 12
j 27, 28, 27, 28, 27, 28 16, 17, 15, 19, 20, 18
(b, c, f, g, , )
k l
i 6, 7, 5, 3, 4, 8 2, 1, 1, 1, 2, 2
j 15, 19, 20, 18, 16, 17 4, 5, 3, 7, 8, 6
(b, c, f, h, , )
k l
i 19, 20, 15, 16, 17, 18 28, 27, 27, 27, 28, 28
j 5, 3, 4, 8, 6, 7 17, 15, 16, 20, 18, 19
(b, d, e, g, , )
k l
i 7, 5, 6, 4, 8, 3 23, 21, 22, 26, 24, 25
j 1, 1, 2, 2, 2, 1 11, 9, 10, 14, 12, 13
(b, d, e, h, , )
k l
i 32, 32, 31, 31, 31, 32 24, 22, 26, 21, 25, 23
j 20, 18, 16, 17, 15, 19 8, 6, 4, 5, 3, 7
(b, d, f, g, , )
k l
i 18, 19, 17, 15, 16, 20 12, 13, 11, 9, 10, 14
j 3, 7, 8, 6, 4, 5 29, 30, 29, 30, 29, 30
(b, d, f, h, , )
G = {
(
(14) ◦ (25);
(
a b
h g
)
,
(
c d
i j
)
,
(
e f
f e
)
,
(
g h
b a
)
,
(
i j
c d
)
,
(
k l
l k
))
,
(
(135) ◦ (246);
(
a b
e f
)
,
(
c d
g h
)
,
(
e f
i j
)
,
(
g h
k l
)
,
(
i j
a b
)
,
(
k l
c d
))
}
Since there does not exist any profile where the payoffs are equal and 〈G〉 is transitive, Γ is non-standard
symmetric. Now the payoffs for (a, c, e, g, i, k) are (1, 2, 1, 2, 1, 2). If there was an automorphism for (12)
then there would be s ∈ A with payoffs (2, 1, 1, 2, 1, 2). Since no such profile exists Γ is only-transitive.
It can be verified that 〈G〉 has order 12, which is equal to the order of 〈(14) ◦ (25), (135) ◦ (246)〉, hence
〈G〉 ∼= 〈(14) ◦ (25), (135) ◦ (246)〉 and 〈G〉N = {idΓ}.
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